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Abstract 
This work proposes action networks as a se­
mantically well founded framework for rea­
soning about actions and change under un­
certainty. Action networks add two primi­
tives to probabilistic causal networks: con­
trollable variables and persistent variables. 
Controllable variables allow the representa­
tion of actions as directly setting the value 
of specific events in the domain, subject to 
preconditions. Persistent variables provide a 
canonical model of persistence according to 
which both the state of a variable and the 
causal mechanism dictating its value persist 
over time unless intervened upon by an ac­
tion (or its consequences). Action networks 
also allow different methods for quantifying 
the uncertainty in causal relationships, which 
go beyond traditional probabilistic quantifi­
cation. This paper describes both recent re­
sults and work in progress. 
1 Introduction 
The work reported in this paper is part of a project 
that proposes a decision support tool for plan simu­
lation and analysis. The objective is to assist a hu­
man/ computer planner in analyzing plan trade-offs 
and in assessing properties such as reliability, robust­
ness, and ramifications under uncertain conditions. 
The core of this tool is a framework for reasoning about 
actions under uncertainty, called action networks. Ac­
tion networks add two primitives to probabilistic 
causal networks (Bayes networks [12]): controllable 
variables and persistent variables. Controllable vari­
ables are the building blocks for the representation of 
actions in the domain. Persistent variables allow the 
modeling of time and change under uncertain condi­
tions. 
Controllable variables can be influenced directly by an 
agent. Thus, their value can be "set" regardless of 
the state and influences of actual possible causes in 
the domain. In this respect action networks follow the 
proposal in [8, 5] except for the introduction of the 
associated notion of a precondition for the action. Ac­
tions will be subject to preconditions connecting con­
trollable variables to other variables that establish con­
ditions for controllability. 
At the heart of reasoning about actions lies the issue 
of modeling persistence and change: how and under 
what conditions should variables in a given domain 
persist over time when they are not influenced by ac­
tions? We propose a canonical model for persistence 
to dictate the states of special variables called persis­
tent variables. Traditionally, the modeling of persis­
tence has been accomplished by relating the state of a 
variable at time t to its state at previous time-points. 
Problems with this approach has recently prompted 
researchers to explicitly model the causal mechanisms 
between variables in a network, and furthermore to 
persist the state of this mechanism over time (see Sec­
tion 2.2). In this paper we further develop this model 
and propose a canonical model for the causal mech­
anisms. This model, called the suppressor model, is 
based on viewing a non-deterministic causal network 
as a parsimonious encoding of a more elaborate de­
terministic one in which suppressors (exceptions) of 
causal influences are explicated, and where all the un­
certainty is in the state of the suppressors. The basic 
intuition here is that suppressors are believed to per­
sist over time, 1 and that variables tend to persist when 
causal influences on them are deactivated by these sup­
pressors. 
Action networks employ quantified causal structures 
in the form of networks as a compact specification of a 
state of belief and as a formal language for specifying 
changes in a state of belief due to both observations 
and actions (12, 8, 5]. The causal structure allows us 
to deal with some of the key obstacles in reasoning 
about action and change such as, the frame and the 
concurrency problems, and reasoning about the indi­
rect consequences of actions. To allow for different 
quantifications of the uncertainty in the causal rela-
1The uncertainty of this persistence is determined by 
the specific domain. 
tions, an action network will consist of two parts: a 
directed graph representing a "blueprint" of the causal 
relationships in the domain and a quantification of 
these relationships. The quantification introduces a 
representation of the uncertainty in the domain be­
cause it specifies the degree to which causes will bring 
about their effects. Action networks will allow un­
certainty to be specified at different levels of abstrac­
tion: point probabilities, which is the common practice 
in causal networks [12], order-of-magnitude probabil­
ities, also known as c-probabilities [8], and symbolic 
arguments, which allow one to explicate logically the 
conditions under which causes would bring about their 
effects (2]. In this paper, we will concentrate on order­
of-magnitude probabilities as proposed in [8]. Other 
quantifications are described elsewhere [2, 5]. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de­
scribes action networks. It starts with a brief review of 
network-based representations (Section 2.1), and con­
tinues with a description of the models of time and 
persistence (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 introduces the 
suppressor model. The representation of actions can 
be found in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 3 summarizes 
the main results and describes future work. 
2 Action Networks 
The specification of an action network requires three 
components: (1) the causal relations in the domain 
with a quantification of the uncertainty in these rela­
tions, (2) the set of variables that are "directly" con­
trollable by actions with the variables that constitute 
their respective preconditions, and (3) variables that 
persist over time, which we will call persistences in 
this paper, and variables that do not persist over time, 
which we will call events. 
Once the domain is modeled using this network-based 
representation (including uncertainty), an action net­
work will be unfolded to create a more elaborate tem­
poral network that includes additional nodes for repre­
senting actions and for representing the values of vari­
ables at different time points. 
In this paper, variables will be denoted by lowercase 
letters e. Binary variables will be assumed to take val­
ues from {false, tru e} ,  which will be denoted by e­
and e+, respectively. For clarity of exposition, vari­
ables will be assumed to be binary, unless stated oth­
erwise, and will be referred to as propositions. An 
instantiated proposition (or set of propositions) will 
be denoted by e, and -,e denotes the "negated" value 
of e. 
2.1 Network Representations 
We briefly review some of the key concepts behind 
causal networks in this section given the central role 
they play in action networks. A causal network con­
sists of a directed-acyclic graph r and a quantification 
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turn_key 
engine_running 
Figure 1: Causal family for engine_running, represent­
ing that turn_key causally influences engine_running. 
turn_key engine_rtmning+ engine_nmning 
true 0 2 
false 0 0 
Table 1: x:-Quantification for the engine_ running fam­
ily. It represents the default causal rule "If turn_key 
then engine_ running". 
Q over r. Nodes in r correspond to domain variables, 
and the directed edges correspond to the causal re­
lations among these variables. We denote the set of 
parents of a node e in a belief network by 1r( e) . i( e) 
will denote a state of the propositions that constitute 
the parent set of e. The set conformed bye and its par­
ents i( e) is usually referred to as the causal family of e. 
Figure 1 depicts the causal family of engine_running. 
This network in conjunction with its quantification in 
terms of the ��:-calculus depicted in Table 1 represents 
the belief that the engine will be running given that 
we turn the ignition key.2 
The quantification of r over the families in the net­
work encodes the uncertainty in the causal influences 
between 1r( e) and e. In Bayesian networks, this uncer­
tainty is encoded using numerical probabilities [12]. 
There are, however, other ways to encode this uncer­
tainty that do not require an exact and complete prob­
ability distribution. Two recent approaches are the 
��:-calculus where uncertainty is represented in terms 
of plain beliefs and degrees of surprise [8], and argu­
ment calculus where uncertainty is represented using 
logical sentences as arguments [2]. These approaches 
are regarded as abstractions of probability theory since 
they retain the main properties of probability includ­
ing Bayesian conditioning [4, 9). 
2 Appendix A reviews the main ideas behind the K­
calculus. 
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An important property of these networks is that a com­
plete and coherent state of belief can be reconstructed 
from the local quantifications of the families. Thus, 
they constitute a compact specification of a state of 
belief. In probabilities for example, given a network 
containing nodes Xt, ... , Xn, 
P(it, ... , x-;,) = IT P(i;li(x;)) (1) 
1$i$n 
Similar equations can be obtained for the ��:-calculus 
and for argument calculus. Since, in this paper we 
concentrate on a quantification based on plain beliefs 
using kappa rankings, we provide a brief review of their 
main properties in Appendix A. 
2.2 Time and Persistence 
When unfolding a persistent variable in an action net­
work, new variables are added to represent its values 
at different time points. This leads to a more elaborate 
causal network that spans over time. The structure of 
this temporal network is the focus of this section. 
Action networks appeal to two assumptions, the re­
alization of which lead to a specific proposal of how 
to expand an action network into a temporal causal 
network. The first assumption states that the causal 
relations between variables at a specific time point are 
similar to those explicated in the action network. That 
is, if e has causes c1, ... , Cn in the action network, it 
will have these causes at every time point. The sec­
ond assumption in action networks relates to temporal 
persistence. It says that the state of the system mod­
eled by an action network persists over time (with a 
certain degree of uncertainty) in the absence of exter­
nal intervention. In the remainder of this section we 
formalize a proposal that realizes these assumptions. 
Before we present our persistence model though, it will 
be illustrative to discuss two intermediate proposals 
that have inspired the current one. 
Persisting Variable States 
Our first approach required that we make each persis­
tence at timet a direct cause of itself at timet+ 1. This 
was intended to represent the influence that the past 
state of a persistence has on its immediate future state. 
For example, assuming that turn_key is an event and 
engine_running is a persistence, this proposal leads to 
Figure 2. This approach is reminiscent of a number of 
proposals in the literature [13, 6). It fails, however, to 
capture the notion of persistence that we are after be­
cause it leads to conclusions that are weaker than one 
would expect. For example, assume that the probabil­
ity of engine_running+ at time t given turn_key+ at 
time t and engine_running- at t - 1 is .9. Suppose 
now that we turn the key at time 0 but the engine 
does not start. We repeat the experiment at times 
1, .. . , n- 1 with similar results (i.e., the engine does 
not run). In this model of persistence, the probability 
of engine_running+ at time n is still .9 given turn_key+ 
at time n. Yet, intuitively, we would expect the car 
not to start at time n given the previous sequence of 
observations.3 
Persisting Causal Mechanisms 
The previous example suggests that it is not enough 
to persist the state of engine_running. One must also 
persist the causal mechanism between turn_key and 
engine_running [11]. The reason why we expect the 
car not to start is due to our previous observations 
which lead us to conclude that the causal mechanism 
between turn_key and engine_running is not behav­
ing normally. Moreover, we seem to assume that the 
state of the existing mechanism persists over time since 
no one intervened to change it. One way to capture 
these intuitions is to explicitly provide a representa­
tion of the causal mechanism between an event e and 
its causes 1r( e) in the network. This solution requires 
that we add (at least) another parent U(e) to each fam­
ily, which represents all possible causal mechanisms 
between 1r(e) and e. The node e will then be deter­
ministic since its state will functionally depend on the 
state of 1r(e) and U(e). This model is intuitively ap­
pealing in that it encodes the causal relation of a family 
as a set of functions between the direct causes 1r(e) and 
their effect e, where the state U( e) selects the "active" 
function that specifies the current causal relation. The 
likelihood that any of these functions is active depends 
on the likelihood of the state of the variable U(e).4 
Using this approach we persist the functional mecha­
nism represented by the U (e) nodes in each family, as 
shown in Figure 3 with regards to the engine_running 
family.5 
3This problem will re-appear even if more refined mod­
els of the domain are proposed. One could, for example, 
add more causal parents representing the exceptions that 
would prevent the engine from running given that the key 
is turned. One such exception can be a dead_battery. Al­
though a step in the right direction, such refinements will 
not solve the problem above, since we can always repro­
duce the counter-example by introdu6ng the appropriate 
set of observations (e.g., the battery was OK at each point 
in time, including time n ). 
tThe assumption behind this representation is that the 
uncertainty recorded in the quantification of each family 
in a network r expresses the incompleteness of our knowl­
edge in the causal relation between e and its set of direct 
causes 1r(e). This incompleteness arises because e inter­
acts with its environment in a complex manner, and this 
interaction usually involves factors which are exogenous to 
1r( e). Furthermore, these factors are usually unknown, un­
observable or too many to enumerate. Thus, we can view 
a. non-deterministic causal family as a parsimonious repre­
sentation of a. more elaborate, deterministic causal family, 
where the quantification summarizes the influence of other 
factors on e. 
5Similar representations were used by Pearl and 
Verma (14] for discovering causal relationships from ob­
servations, and by Druzdzel and Simon (7] in their study 














Figure 2: "Simple" temporal expansion of the family encoding the relation between turn_key and engine_running. 











Figure 3: Temporal expansion of the family encoding the relation between turn_key and engine_running, and 
including the dynamics of their causal relation through the persistence of the node U( engine_running ). The 
concentric circles indicate that the engine_running node is deterministic, and depends functionally on the states 
of turn_key and U( engine_running). 
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Unfortunately, even though the model in Figure 3 ex­
plicates and persists the causal mechanism between 
causes and their effects, it is too weak to capture the 
notion of persistence we are after. Suppose for exam­
ple that we turn the key at time 0. The system will 
then infer that the engine will be running at time 0 
with probability .9. However, the model will not be 
able to conclude that the engine will continue to be 
running at times 1, 2, . . . , and so on. In fact, from 
the topology of Figure 3, we can see that whether the 
engine is running at time t + 1 is marginally indepen­
dent of whether the key was turned at time t, which is 
contrary to what we would expect from the persistence 
assumption. 
Persisting Variable States and Causal Mecha­
nisms 
The approach we adopt, depicted in Figure 5, can 
be regarded as a combination of the temporal net­
works in Figures 2 and 3. The proposition en­
gine_running is functionally determined by turn_key, 
S( engine_running ), and I ( engine_running ) . The vari­
able S( engine_ running) captures all possible sup­
pressors of the causal influences that the proposi­
tion turn_key has on engine_running. The variable 
I( engine_running) decides the state of engine_ running 
when the the suppressors manage to deactivate the 
causal influence of turn_key on engine_running, and 
it is directly influenced by the past state of en-. . gme_runnmg. 
In the static case, when time is not involved, the pro­
posal can be viewed as splitting the variable U(e) into 
two variables, S(e) and /(e). Note, however, that once 
we expand over time the notion of a causal mecha­
nism has a broader scope because it has to account for 
the previous value of proposition e. The semantics of 
the variable S( e) assumes that the uncertainty in the 
causal relation between e and its causes 1r( e) is due to a 
set of abnormalities and exceptions that suppress this 
causal influence. When this influence is suppressed 
due to these exceptions and abnormalities the value of 
e is set according to its previous state (represented by 
the variable I (e)). This model of persistence makes 
two assumptions. First, it assumes that the state of 
suppressors tend to persist over time (with a degree 
of uncertainty determined by the specific application). 
Second, it assumes that the state of variable/( e) is de­
termined by the state of e at the previous time point. 6 
This model is not only intuitive and solves the prob­
lems outlined above, but it allows for a modular quan­
tification of the network: the uncertainty in the causal 
relations, the uncertainty in the persistence of suppres­
sors, and the uncertainty in the persistence of variables 
An expansion similar to the one in Figure 3 is used by 
Balke and Pearl [1] for answering probabilistic counter­
factual queries, and by Heckerman and Shachter [11] for 
capturing the notion of causal persistence. 
6Both these assumptions can be relaxed and lead to 
more elaborate models (see Section 3). 
tum_key 
engine_running 
Figure 4: The suppressor model as a functional expan­
sion of causal network. 
can be specified independently (see Eqs. 5 and 6). 
The following section will discuss the suppressor model 
in more detail. 
2.3 The Suppressor Model 
To formally describe the suppressor model we first ex­
amine how it expands a "static" causal network into a 
functional one, where all causal relations are determin­
istic and all the uncertainty is about the states of root 
nodes. Then we show how this functional expansion 
of a causal network lends itself naturally for captur­
ing the persistence assumptions that we stated in the 
previous section. 
As a proposal for functionally expanding a causal net­
work, the suppressor model is based on the following 
intuition. The uncertainty in the causal influences be­
tween 1r( e) and e is a summary of the set of excep­
tions that attempt to defeat or suppress this relation. 
For example, "a banana in the tailpipe" is a possible 
suppressor of the causal influence that turn_key has 
on engine_running. The expansion into the suppres­
sor model makes the uncertain causal relation between 
1r( e) and e functional by adding a new parent S( e) to 
the family, which corresponds to the suppressors to 
the causal relation. In addition to S( e), another par­
ent /(e) is added, which will set the state of e in those 
cases in which the suppressors manage to defeat the 
causal influence of 7!'( e) on e. In these cases we say 
that the suppressors are "active" . Figure 4 depicts 
the expansion of the engine_running family. 
Once a causal network is functionally expanded ac­
cording to the suppressor model, the persistence as­
sumption stated in the previous section can be for­
malized by taking the variable /(e) to represent the 
previous state of e - see Figure 5. The intuition be­
ing that in those cases where the suppressors manage 
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Figure 5: The suppressor model for the engine_running family. 
of e should simply persist and follow its previous state. 
We will now present the suppressor model formally. 
Let S(e) take values out of the set {w0,w1,w2, . . . )1 
where S( e) = ws stands for "a sup�ressor o� stre?gth 
s is active." The function F relatmg e to 1ts duect 
causes 1r( e) , the suppressors S( e), and the variable 
/(e) is given by 
if K(e- I i(e)) > i; 
if x:(e+ I iT( e))> i; F(i(e),w',l(e)) = { ��: 
!(e), otherwise. 
(2) 
Where ��:( e J7r( e)) represents the strength of belief in th.e causal relation between 1r(e) and e. Eq. �says that tf 
the strength of the active suppressor w' is less than 
the causal influence of 1r( e) on e, then the state of e is 
dictated by the causal influence. Otherwise, the sup­
pressor is successful, the causal influence is suppressed, 
and the state of e is the same as the state of I (e). 
The translation ofF into a K matrix is given by below: 
if e = F(i(e),w1 ,l(e)); 
otherwise. (3) 
The prior distribution of beliefs on S( e) is given by 
(4) 
which reflects the intuition that suppressors are typi­
cally inactive, and that the stronger the suppressor is, 
the more unlikely that it will be active. 
Using the suppressor model, we can take any non­
deterministic network quantified with kappas and au­
tomatically expand it into a functional network in the 
7In general, the suppressor takes values in 
{w0, w1, w2, • • .  , w00 }. In practice, however, it suffices for 
the suppressor to take values in { wk} where the ranking k 
appears in the matrix of e. 
sense that all causal relations are deterministic and the 
only uncertainty is regarding suppressors. Moreover, 
we get the following guarantee about the resulting 
functional network , which says that the new network 
captures all the information which the initial network 
was set to capture. Let K represent the quantification 
of a non-deterministic network and let 1\.1 represent the 
quantification of its functional expansion: 
Theorem 1 K(e I i(e)) = K'(e I if( e)). 
The proof of this theorem relies on marginalizing 
K'(CJi(e), S(e), f(e)) over all the states of S(e) and 
I( e). 
Table 2 shows the automatic functional expansion 
of the causal relation between engine_running and 
1r( engine_running) (depicted in Figure 1 and K­
quantified in Table 1) reflecting Eq. 2. 
turn-k�y S engin�....runnin� I enJ{ine-runnin�r eriiine_runnans 
uue ..,u true true 
uue ..,u fa.Jse true 
&rue w/. &rue true 
uue w• fa.he false 
false ..,v true fru.e 
fa.l:;e ..,v fa..lse r .. lae 
false w• true true 
faJ�e w" false fa.be 
Table 2: Deterministic function relating en­
gine.running and its parents in the suppressor model. 
In order to complete the temporal expansion, shown 
in Figure 5, we must quantify the uncertainty on the 
persistence arcs. Causal families are connected, across 
time points, through the I (e) node and the suppressor 
S(e) node. The conditional beliefs k(S(et+z)JS(et)) 
and K(f(e1+t)Jej) will formally determine the strength 
of persistence across time. Both conditional beliefs will 
encode a bias against a change of state, which captures 
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the intuition that any change of state must be causally 
motivated. Note that this quantification is done mod­
ularly and independently of the quantification of the 
uncertainty in the causal relations. This separation is 
important for fast and efficient model building. 
The quantification of these beliefs will be of course 
tied directly with an actual application and a specific 
domain. In our experiments, and for the planning do­
main implemented we had intuitive results with the 
following model in which the strength of the persis­
tence assumption is proportional to the strength of 
the change in the state of the suppressor: 
(5) 
The assumption of persistence for the I ( e) node cor­
responds to the following equation: 
if j( et+d ::f ei; 
otherwise. (6) 
Since I( et ) determines the state of et+l when suppres­
sors are active, the number p can be interpreted as the 
degree of surprise in a non-causal change of state of 
the proposition et+l·s 
Example. Consider the engine_running network in 
Figure 1 quantified as in Table 1. Assume that this 
network is temporally expanded using the suppressor 
model (see Eq. 3 and Figure 5). Given the ignition key 
is turned at times 1, 2, 3, . . . , n- 1 and that the engine 
is not running at times 1, 2, 3, . . .  , n -1, the model will 
yield the belief that the engine will not be running at 
time n, given that the key is turned at time n. On 
the other hand, given that the key is turned at time 0, 
the system will infer that the engine will be running at 
time 0, and moreover that it will be running at times 
1, ... , n. 
2.4 Actions and Preconditions 
For the representation of actions, we essentially follow 
the proposal in [8], which treats actions as external di­
rect interventions that deterministically set the value 
of a given proposition in the domain. Actions are spec­
ified by indicating which nodes in the causal network 
are controllable and under what preconditions. Syn­
tactically, we introduce a new node " I" denoting 
controllability. In Figure 6 for example, both fired_gun 
and /oaded_gun are controllable propositions. A suit­
able precondition for both nodes can be holding_gun, 
which can be represented as just another direct cause 
of these nodes. The corresponding matrices will then 
be constructed to reflect the intuition that the action 
doe will be effective only if the precondition is true; 
otherwise, the state of a node e is decided completely 
by the state of its natural causes (that is, excluding 
doe and the preconditions of do,). Let the variable 
doe take the same values as e in addition to the value 
8This value does not need to be constant, although it 
will assumed to be so in the remainder of the paper. 
DO_fire_qun 
fired_gun 
unable to stand 
Figure 6: Causal family containing actions and rami­
fications (YSP). 
idle.9 The new parent set of e after e is declared as 
controllable will be 1r( e) U {doe}. The new ranking 
��:'(fli(e) 1\ d�e) is 
{ ��:(fli(e)) 
��:'(eji(e) 1\ d;e) = � 
if d;e =idle 
if d;, ::p e 
if d;e = e 
(7) 
For simplicity of exposition we have omitted possible 
preconditions. Their inclusion will just involve a re­
finement of the cases in Eq. 7 to reflect the fact that 
an action is possible iff its preconditions are satisfied. 
The advantage of using this proposal as opposed to 
others, such as STRIPS, is that the approach based on 
direct intervention takes advantage of the network rep­
resentation for dealing with the indirect consequences 
of actions and the related frame problem. In specify­
ing the action "shooting" , for example, the user need 
not worry about how this action will affect the state of 
other related consequences such as bang_noise or alive 
(see Figure 6). 
Example. Consider the example in Figure 6 encod­
ing a version of the Yale Shooting Problem (YSP) [10]. 
The relevant piece of causal knowledge available is that 
if a victim is shot with a loaded gun, then she/he will 
die. There are two possible actions, shooting and load­
ing/unloading the gun. It is also assumed that both 
loaded and alive persist over time. Given this infor­
mation the implementation of action networks will ex­
pand the network in Figure 6 both functionally and 
temporally. 
In the first scenario, we observe at time 0 that the 
individual is alive and that the gun is loaded, and that 
9Thus, ife is binary d�e E {e+,e-, idle}. 
there is a shooting action at time 2. The model will 
yield that alive at time 2 will be false.10 This scenario 
shows the interplay between the persistences and the 
causal influences in the network. 
In the second scenario, it is observed that at time 2 
alive is true (the victim actually survived the shoot­
ing) . The model will then conclude that: first, the 
gun must have been unloaded prior to the shooting 
(although it is not capable of asserting when), and fur­
thermore, the belief of an action leading to unloading 
the gun increases (proportional to the degree of per­
sistence in loading) . This scenario displays the model 
capabilities for performing abductive reasoning includ­
ing reasoning about the set of actions that would yield 
a given observation. 
3 Conclusions and Future Work 
We described the models of time, persistence, and ac­
tion that constitute the core of action networks as a 
formalism for reasoning about actions and change un­
der uncertainty. The notion of persistence was for­
malized through the suppressor model which evolved 
from other proposals for extending causal networks 
over time. The suppressor model should be viewed as 
one canonical model for representing persistence. Re­
laxing the assumptions in this model will yield other 
possible, more complex representations. For example 
we can make the I (e) node depend on more than one 
past instance of e. This would allow the representation 
of time-decaying functions for the dependence of e on 
its past values. We are currently exploring and charac­
terizing this and other alternatives with the objective 
to provide a library of such models that would assist 
the user in encoding the dynamics of causal relations 
in the domain of interest. 
We also intend to add notions of utility and preferences 
on outcomes and to explore the use of action networks 
in the formulation of a plan, given a set of objectives. 
The paths we are currently exploring include abduc­
tive methods for uncovering the sequence of actions 
that can lead to a specific set if beliefs, and the pos­
sibility of interfacing action networks as an evaluation 
component to a planning module. 
This paper has focused on the ��:-calculus instantia­
tion of action networks. Future work includes allowing 
other quantifications of uncertainty, such as probabili­
ties, and arguments, and even a mixture of these. We 
are also studying a probabilistic (and argument-based) 
interpretation of the suppressor model. The first steps 
toward the quantification of action networks with ar­
guments is reported in [5]. 
Finally we remark that all the features of action net-
10The reasons for this conclusion are due to the con­
ditional independences assumed in the causal network 
representation. They are formally explained in depth 
in [12][Chapter 10] and [8]. 
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works described in this paper, including the suppres­
sor model expansion, the temporal expansion, and the 
specification of actions, are fully implemented on top 
of CNETS [3].U All the examples described in this 
paper were tested using this implementation. 
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A Appendix: A Review of The Kappa 
Calculus. 
We provide a brief summary of the ��:-calculus and how 
it can quantify over the causal relations in a network 
r. 
Let M be a set of worlds, each world m E M being a 
truth-value assignment to a finite set of atomic propo­
sitional variables (e1, e2, . . . , e0 ) . Thus any world m 
can be represented by the conjunction of ei /1. .. . /1. e-;;. 
A belief ranking function ��:(m) is an assignment of 
non-negative integers to the elements of M such that 
��:(m) = 0 for at least one m E M. Intuitively, K(m) 
represents the degree of surprise associated with find­
ing a world m realized, worlds assigned 11: = 0 are 
considered serious possibilities, and worlds assigned 
11: = oo are considered absolute impossibilities. A 
proposition e is believed iff ��:(...,e) > 0 (with degree 
k iff ��:(...,e) = k), where 
(8) 
��:(m) can be considered an order-of-magnitude approx­
imation of a probability function P(m) by writing 
P(m) as a polynomial of some small quantity t and 
taking the most significant term of that polynomial, 
i.e., P(m) � Cc:"(m). Treating E as an infinitesi­
mal quantity induces a conditional ranking function 
��:(eic) on propositions and wffs governed by properties 
derived from the £-probabilistic interpretation [9). 
A causal structure r can be quantified using a rank­
ing belief function 11: by specifying the conditional be­
lief for each proposition e given every state of i(e), 
that is ��:( eji( e)). Thus , for example, Table 1 shows 
11CNETS is an experimental environment for represent­
ing and reasoning with generalized causal networks, which 
allow the quantification of uncertainty using probabilities, 
" degrees of belief, and logical arguments [2]. 
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the ��:-quantification of the engine_running family in 
Figure 1. Table 1 is called the "��:-matrix" for the en­
gine_running family. It represents the default causal 
rule: "If turn_key+ then engine_ running+". 
The ��:-calculus does not require commitment about 
the belief in e+ or e-. Thus, as Table 1 in­
dicates, we may be ignorant about the status 
of the engine_running given that the ignition key 
is not turned. In such a case the user may 
specify that both ��:(engine_running+jturn_key-) = 
��:( engine_running-lturn_key-) = 0 indicating that 
both alternatives are plausible. 
Once similar matrices for each one of the families in 
a given network r are specified, the complete ranking 
function can be reconstructed by requiring that 
��:(m) = :�:::>(eili(e;)), (9) 
and queries about belief for any proposition and wff 
can be computed using any of the well-known dis­
tributed algorithms for belief update (12, 3]. The class 
of ranking functions that comply with the require­
ments of Eq. 9 for a given network rare called stratified 
rankings. These rankings present analogous properties 
about conditional independence to those possessed by 
probability distributions quantifying a network with 
the same structure (8]. 
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